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The  Adja  plateau  (Benin)  is  densely  populated  by  tenant  and  landowner  farmers  engaged  in oil palm
based  cropping.  Landowners  use  oil  palm  sap  for the  production  of  sodabi  (a local  spirit),  and  an  oil
palm  fallow  (if  no crops  are grown  beneath  the  palms)  to restore  soil fertility.  In this area,  growing  oil
palm  for  its oil  is uncommon.  Tenants  access  the land  under  speciﬁc  contracts  but are not  allowed  to
plant  oil  palm.  They  grow  food  crops  beneath  the  oil  palm  and  extend  the cropping  period  by severely
pruning  the  palms  because  their  right  to grow  food  crops  terminates  when  the  palms  reach  a  height
of  2 m. The  competing  claims  between  landowners  and  tenants  and  between  oil  palm  and  annual  food
crops  result  in  conﬂicts  over  practices  that  either  degrade  or  restore  soil  fertility.  Using  a  political  ecologyil palm fallow
olitical ecology
enin
perspective,  we  examined  how  two  overlapping  institutions  shape  access  to and  management  of the  land:
the  customary  tenure  system  and  the  legal  system  that  was  introduced  to  regulate  titling  and  contracting.
These institutions  have  divergent  implications  for tenants  and  landowners,  in  terms  of  both  social  equity
and land  management  practices.  The  implications  of  this  institutional  patchwork  (bricolage)  for  joint
learning  to achieve  sustainable  agriculture  are  discussed.
© 2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Sciences. Published by Elsevier B.V.. Introduction
Oil palm (Elaeis guineensis)  is native to West Africa [1] but the
orld’s largest production centres are now in Indonesia (36% of
lobal production) and Malaysia (47%) [2]. The crop has long been
f strategic importance in Benin. In 1856, King Ghezo of Dahomey
in the south of present-day Benin) initiated the palm oil trade and
assed a law forbidding his subjects from cutting down oil palms.
e allowed farmers to crop the land under the palms until these
ere so tall that other crops were shaded out. This rule resulted
n farmers pruning the palm trees to slow their growth. When no
rops are grown beneath the palms the land use is known as oil
alm fallow [3].  Under conditions of land sufﬁciency and hence
ong fallow cycles the oil palm fallow is sustainable. Technically the
dja plateau oil palm system is considered an agroforestry system
onstituted by complementary economic and ecological relation-
hips between the crops and the palms. The decision by the Benin
overnment in 1993 to make the oil palm sector a national pri-
rity and the subsequent revival of oil palm as a mono-crop have
∗ Corresponding author at: Faculté des Sciences Agronomiques, Université
’Abomey-Calavi, 01 BP 526 Cotonou, Benin. Tel.: +229 94208649.
E-mail address: rolandyemadje@yahoo.fr (R.H. Yemadje).
573-5214/$ – see front matter ©  2012 Royal Netherlands Society for Agricultural Scienc
ttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.njas.2012.06.007 All rights reserved.
contributed to intensiﬁcation of land conﬂicts [4],  even in areas that
are marginal for oil palm because of insufﬁcient rainfall. Increased
land scarcity and intensiﬁcation of cropping in turn has resulted in
more intensive oil palm pruning (and hence lower palm productiv-
ity), intensifying conﬂicts between landowners and tenants.
South Benin has the highest population growth rate in Benin
and hosts 50% of the country’s population on only 7.7% of the
national territory [5]. The high population pressure on the Adja
plateau, where both the Adja and Fon ethnic groups live, implies
that oil palm monocropping in commercial plantations would com-
pete directly with food production. In fact, oil palm is not grown on
the plateau primarily for its oil because the average annual rainfall
(less than 1100 mm and highly variable, both spatially and tem-
porally [6])  is not conducive to high levels of palm oil production.
The climate is sub-equatorial with a bimodal rainfall distribution.
The soils are classiﬁed as Nitisols (terre de barre; sandy to sandy
loam soils, according to the FAO soil classiﬁcation) and as sols fer-
ralitiques de dominance rouge (in the French classiﬁcation system)
[7]. Such soils are intrinsically fertile (which explains in part the
high population density on the plateau).The oil palm based cropping system (OPBCS; for a list of
acronyms, see Appendix A) combines oil palm grown by landown-
ers for sodabi (a local commercial spirit) and food crops grown
by tenants between the palms [2].  The landless tenants view any
es. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
9  Journ
i
p
l
c
g
s
t
t
c
s
a
p
t
e
s
t
n
s
(
w
(
c
i
p
w
t
u
t
h
s
t
t
o
q
u
s
l
b
t
a
t
p
i
l
A
l
r
o
u
t
t
a
t
M
p
l
s
a
s
t
o
m
a2 R.H. Yemadje et al. / NJAS - Wageningen
ntrusion of commercial oil palm plantations into the OPBCS on the
lateau as a threat to food production.
The intercropping practice traditionally consisted of a relatively
ong cultivation period during which the land was used for food
rops, followed by a fallow period in which only oil palm trees were
rown in dense stands, typically lasting 15 years [8].  Such exten-
ive oil palm fallow periods are known as palmier jachère (similar
o the jachère de manioc described by Saidou et al. [9]). Technically,
he oil palm stage is not a fallow but a component of a contested
ropping system. According to Brouwers [8],  the OPBCS can be con-
idered sequentially as two stages: an oil palm fallow stage and
n intercropping stage with juvenile or more mature (but pruned)
alm trees. The oil palm fallow restores soil fertility [8] and con-
rols the aggressive cogon grass (Imperata cylindrica)  [2,10].  At the
nd of the fallow period, the palms are cut down to extract the
ap to make palm wine and spirits [11]; non-destructive tapping
echniques are not commonly practised in this area. Thereafter, a
ew cycle can start based on the cultivation of food crops and palm
eedlings on the same ﬁelds. The young palms of local provenance
dura type) are intercropped, with the permission of the landowner,
ith food crops such as cowpea (Vigna unguiculata), groundnut
Arachis hypogaea), pigeonpea (Cajanus cajan), maize (Zea mays) and
assava (Manihot esculenta). The tenants try to prolong the period
n which they are allowed to cultivate food crops by pruning the
alm leaves. In contrast, in the oil palm belt of south-eastern Benin
here higher rainfall allows intensive cultivation and encourages
he use of improved oil palm cultivars (tenera type), food cropping
nderneath the palms typically is carried out for less than 5 years.
The high population density on the Adja plateau has implica-
ions for land access and tenure arrangements [8],  which in turn
ave major implications for soil fertility management. Owner-
hip of the land (and hence right of access) implies ownership of
he oil palm trees planted on that land. The long-term social and
echnical sustainability of the OPBCS depends on the willingness
f landowners to allow extended intercropping (and the conse-
uent pruning practice) as long as soil fertility, supposedly built
p during the fallow period, is maintained. However, Brouwers’
tudy [8] did not show recovery of soil fertility as a result of fal-
owing, suggesting that the oil palm fallow may  be driven more
y landowners’ concerns about maintaining their right of access
o land than by agronomic considerations. Alternative tenurial
rrangements do exist but appear to provide insufﬁcient incen-
ives to tenants to invest in soil fertility maintenance [12]. Land use
ractices have become politically charged and a cause of increas-
ng tension between landowners and tenants. Soil fertility and
and tenure issues are high on the development agenda on the
dja plateau. Technical advice about good practices is provided to
andowners by both the governmental extension service and the
esearch group supporting local initiatives for sustainable devel-
pment (Groupe de Recherche et d’Appui aux Initiatives de Base pour
n Développement Durable—GRAIB). An American-led programme,
he Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), has implemented a land
itling project from November 2007 to April 2011, that aimed to cre-
te a system of formal titling and registration (plans fonciers ruraux)
hroughout Benin (including 34 villages on the Adja plateau). The
CA  attempted to demonstrate how to create effective and trans-
arent governance of land, reduce the time and cost of obtaining a
and title, and reduce the number of land disputes.
The present study examined, from a political ecology per-
pective, how the aforementioned pressures affect the social and
groecological dynamics of the OPBCS and identiﬁed options for
oil fertility maintenance and land use under changing condi-
ions. We  document in this article the knowledge and practices
f landowners and tenants and the ways in which their land
anagement and tenure contracting practices are connected. Our
nalysis concludes that the conditions for sustainable developmental of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 91– 99
of the OPBCS depend on both technical and institutional condi-
tions. We applied a political ecology framework [13,14] to analyse
the relationships between land and soil management practices
and socio-institutional processes. Following a presentation of our
methodology the remainder of the article is structured in terms
of performance constraints, soil fertility management practices,
tenure arrangements, land tenure conﬂicts and state interventions.
2. Methodology
An overriding question guided this research. What are the
constraints and opportunities for landowners’ and tenants’ farm-
ing practices in the oil palm based cropping system on the Adja
plateau? Field research was conducted from March 2010 through
March 2011. The term Adja plateau throughout this paper refers
to the entire geographic area of the six administrative districts
of Klouekanme, Toviklin, Lalo, Aplahoue, Dogbo and Djakotome
(Fig. 1). The term Adja farmer refers to ethnic Adja. Similarly, the
term Fon refers to ethnic Fon settled on the Adja plateau. The ten-
ancy and ownership arrangements described are not speciﬁc to
either ethnic group.
The diagnostic study was  conducted following a literature
review and archival research. In collaboration with the extension
service, GRAIB, MCA, and with reference to relevant literature about
the Adja plateau [15,16], two  districts were chosen: Klouekanme
and Toviklin. The choice was based on the following criteria: (1)
OPBCS is the prevailing system of oil palm production [15,16],  (2)
local land tenure arrangements that determine rights to grow and
rights to harvest oil palm and food crops [17], and (3) recent inter-
ventions in land tenure arrangements.
A short preliminary visit allowed the ﬁrst author to introduce
himself to key persons and to explore the area’s characteristics –
such as farmers’ participation in the titling programme, customary
tenure, and ethnicity – through discussions with key informants
(farmers, local leaders, market dealers, and extension staff). Subse-
quently, a transect line across the area was drawn at random on a
map  and a mega-transect of 20 km aligned northeast to southwest
was constructed with the aid of a global positioning instrument. The
ﬁve villages positioned along the transect were selected as research
sites; two  of these villages had participated in the MCA  programme
(Agbago and Sognonouhoue) and three had not (Akouegbadja,
Sogadjihoue and Tossahoue). The latter two villages turned out to
be small and to share the same landscape; subsequently the farmers
of both villages participated in joint focus group discussions [FDGs],
and the results were combined in the analysis. This allowed us to
use the MCA  programme as an experimental treatment so as to
enable comparison.
Fifteen focus group discussions [18] were held, three in each
of the ﬁve study villages; each group consisted, on average, of
15 male landowners, 15 male tenants and 15 female tenants in
order to provide detailed information on important local issues.
The participants in each case were asked about growing food crops
underneath the oil palm trees, about land tenure, conﬂicts, types of
soils/land, criteria used to evaluate soil fertility, and innovations in
soil and land management. The perceived constraints, their causes,
and opportunities were then ranked by the participants and options
for techno-institutional solutions to alleviate the main constraints
were jointly analysed.
Next, a survey with 90 randomly chosen farming households
was implemented, using a semi-structured questionnaire. The ran-
dom selection of respondents was based on a list of household
heads that was drawn up for each village, and triangulated with
the chiefs and key informants in the villages. The randomly selected
respondents represented a 20% sampling from the list of household
heads. Each interview lasted about 1 h. As dependent household
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ources:  Data from IGN, 1992, and ﬁeldwork for this study, 2011.
embers could have different insights and options, we used addi-
ional information from the FDGs. A joint workshop with farmers (3
illage chiefs from Agbago, Akouegbadja and Sognonnouhoue, the
resident of the oil palm growers from Klouekanme, 5 landowners
nd 5 tenants per village) was held at the end of the ﬁeldwork to
alidate the ﬁndings.
The qualitative data from the key informants and FDGs were
ranscribed from ﬁeld diaries, ﬂipcharts and a tape recorder into
nglish and stored electronically; thereafter, related information
as been sorted and organized to generate a qualitative descrip-
ion. The quantitative data (relating to conﬂict resolution, naturericts and the mega-transect.
of tenancy agreements, and number of plots under various land
tenure arrangements) from the survey were entered in EpiData
(EpiData Association, Odense, Denmark; version 3.1) to calculate
percentages of occurrence.
3. Results3.1. The OPBCS performance constraints
The landowners and the male tenants ranked poor soil fertil-
ity (Table 1) as the ﬁrst constraint in all study villages, except
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Table  1
Landowners’ and tenants’ ranking of perceived factors shaping the oil palm based cropping system. The higher the priority, the lower the score.
Constraints Agbago (n = 55) Akouegbadja (n = 70) Sogadjihoue and Tossahoue (n = 30) Sognonnouhoue (n = 50)
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Poor soil fertility 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3
Poor  rainfall 2 2 2 3 4 5 2 2 2 1 1 2
Unavailability of
fertilizer
3 4 4 2 3 3 3 5 5 3 4 4
Lack  of land and no
access to land
5 5 1 6 2 1 7 3 3 6 5 1
Weed  damage 4 7 5 7 7 8 6 3 3 4 7 5
Pest  damage 6 6 6 8 8 9 4 6 6 5 6 6
Lack  of credit 7 3 7 9 9 4 5 7 7 7 3 7
Field  ﬂooded – – – 5 6 7 – – – – – –
Lack  of market to sell
food crop
– – – 4 5 6 – – – – – –
Source: Farmer discussion groups: male landowners, male and female tenants, April–October 2010.
Table 2
Landowners’ and tenants’ ranking of perceived causes of soil fertility degradation. The lower the ranking, the more important is the cause of soil fertility degradation.
Possible causes Agbago (n = 55) Akouegbadja (n = 70) Sognonnouhoue (n = 50) Sogadjihoue and Tossahoue (n = 30)
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Demographic pressure
on limited lands
2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lack  of rotation 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 2 2 2
Ploughinga 4 4 4 4 4 4
Lack of crop residues to
cover soil with
5 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 2 4 4 4
Burning of pruned oil
palm leaves
1 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 4 3 3 3
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Source: Male landowners’ and male and female tenants’ focus group discussions, Ap
a Farmers in Sognonouhoue and Sogadjihoue and Tossahoue do not practise plou
ognonnouhoue where low rainfall was ranked ﬁrst. Low rainfall
as identiﬁed as the second most important problem. The female
enants ranked access to land as their ﬁrst constraint, except in
ogadjihoue and Tossahoue. The landowners often ranked unavail-
bility of inorganic fertilizers third. In general, only tenants listed
and tenure arrangements as a constraint. Poor soil fertility was
ttributed to several factors (Table 2). In Agbago and Akouegbadja,
he burning of crop residues (including pruned oil palm leaves)
n itself was thought to reduce soil fertility in the long term. In
able 3
andowners’ and tenants’ ranking of strategies to cope with low yields and poor soil ferti
Land management
practices
Agbago (n = 55) Akouegbadja (n = 70) 
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowners Male
tenant
Household waste 2 – 2 2 – 
Inorganic fertilizer 1 1 1 1 1 
Oil  palm fallow 10 – – 10 – 
Rotation cowpea/maize 3 2 5 3 2 
Rotation groundnut/maize 3ex 6 6 3ex 6 
Residue burning – – – – – 
Non-burning of on-ﬁeld
biomass
11 – 7 11 – 
Pigeonpea 7 – – 7 – 
Cassava fallow 5 5 3 5 5 
Mucuna – – – – – 
Acacia  spp. fallow – – – – – 
Sweet  potato – 4 – – 4 
Natural fallow 8 – – 8 – 
Tomato 6 3 4 6 3 
Plough/ridgesa 9 7 – 9 7 
ource: Male landowners’, and male and female tenants’ focus groups discussions, April–
a Farmers in Sognonouhoue and Sogadjihoue and Tossahoue do not practise ploughingctober 2010.
 or ridging.
the three other villages residue burning was not valued so nega-
tively; landowners in these villages ranked oil palm fallow high as
a soil fertility management strategy (Table 3). These phenomena
are linked.3.2. Soil fertility management practices
The respondents listed numerous practices (Table 3) for main-
taining soil fertility. Inorganic fertilizer is used and was  ranked
lity. The lower the ranking of a land management practice, the higher its priority.
Sognonouhoue (n = 50) Sogadjihoue and Tossahoue (n = 30)
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
Landowner Male
tenant
Female
tenant
2 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2 2 2 2 2 2
– 3 – – 3 – –
5 4 3 3 4 3 3
6 4ex 3ex 3ex 4ex 3ex 3ex
– 6 5 5 6 5 5
7 9 – – 9 – –
– 7 – – 7 – –
3 8 – – 8 – –
– 10 – – 10 – –
– 11 – – 11 – –
– – – – – – –
– 12 – – 12 – –
4 – – 6 – – 6
–
October 2010.
 or ridging.
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rst as the main strategy for maintaining crop yields by both
andowners and tenants in Agbago and Akouegbadja whereas those
n Sognonnouhoue and Tossahoue ranked this strategy second in
mportance after application of household waste (a mixture of com-
ound wastes from many sources). The cultivation of tomato (and,
y male tenants only, possibly also sweet potato), a crop that is
lways fertilized, was mentioned frequently as a response to poor
ields of other crops, mainly in Agbago and Akouegbadja, sug-
esting that the fertilizer used on this market crop was  regarded
eneﬁcial for subsequent crops. In Agbago and Akouegbadja, the
ale tenants interviewed said that they did not bring household
astes to the rented ﬁelds unless they were assured of the wastes
eneﬁting their crops in the subsequent cropping seasons. Exten-
ion agents had observed that when tenants applied wastes on
ented ﬁelds, some landowners claimed back the ﬁelds in order
o beneﬁt from the improvement following waste application. Oil
alm fallow was ranked third by landowners in the latter two
illages. Other forms of fallow that were mentioned by these
andowners were Mucuna fallow and Acacia auriculiformis fallow.
assava fallow was mentioned especially in Agbago and Akoueg-
adja and was  ranked as important by landowners and tenants,
oth male and female. Landowners always ranked natural fallow
ery low. Rotations of maize and legumes (cowpea, groundnut)
ere ranked relatively high by landowners and tenants in all study
illages.
The landowners in Agbago, subsequent to the conﬁdence they
ained through land registration that resulted from the MCA’s
ntervention, mentioned their willingness to admit tenants access
nd crop their land following an oil palm fallow.
The landowners in both Agbago and Akouegbadja did not burn
iomass on their oil palm ﬁelds (claiming that this practice was
etrimental to soil fertility; Tables 2 and 4) whereas this practice
as still followed in the other villages, where it was  considered to
ontribute to soil fertility. Some landowners, and in some villages
lso female tenants, referred to the importance of using the palm
eaves as mulch; male tenants did not rank this practice.
In Agbago and Akouegbadja, both villages with a Fon population,
idging was practised by both landowners and male tenants. In the
illages where the Adja are dominant, ridging was not practised. A
harp hoe blade is used in the Fon ridging technique, which consists
f cutting deep into the soil and piling the dirt into the ridges. The
arth of the old ridges is cut and turned over at the start of each
eason, one half into the furrow to the left and the other half to the
ight. In this way the soil and decomposing organic matter from
ower levels are brought to the surface and form a substratum for
he new crops planted on top of the ridges.
Female tenants in all the study villages reported growing a cow-
ea variety (egbamonlou in the Adja language) that is perceived by
oth male and female tenants to have a negative effect on soil fertil-
ty but that fetches the highest market price of all cowpea varieties.
n the discussions many farmers mentioned (Table 4) their willing-
ess to experiment with cowpea varieties, including egbamonlou.
andowners, preferring to combine household waste application
ith the addition of a small amount of inorganic fertilizer, also
howed interest in experimenting with soil fertility management
ptions; however, their favoured practice, being partly a function
f the nature/quality of the organic matter, demands a long-term
xperimental design. In addition, landowners and tenants wish to
valuate the practice of ridging in relation to soil fertility manage-
ent, since there is a clear difference in practice between Adja and
on farmers..3. Land tenure regimes at village level
Access to land for farming is unequal. Land can be accessed
nder a number of arrangements, resting on permanent oral of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 91– 99 95
non-permanent rights (Table 5). Two main types of permanent
landholding were identiﬁed: family lands and individual lands
(either by patriarchal and matriarchal inheritance or by pur-
chase, doukohwoue). There were no chiefs’ holdings or government
lands in the study villages. Adja women have no land inheritance
rights and have to rely for access on one of the non-permanent
arrangements described in the next section. The doudeasso tenure
arrangement (Table 5) was  found only in Sogadjihoue, Sognon-
nouhoue and Tossahoue. The farmers in Agbago and Akouegbadja
knew about this system of tenure, but had abandoned it.
3.4. Land tenure conﬂicts at village level
The ambiguity and non-respect of tenure arrangements
(Table 5) are often sources of conﬂict over land. Conﬂicts occur
between tenants and landowners in the case of doudeasso when
tenants are reluctant to quit the land. In order to keep the land for
a longer period than implied by the agreement, tenants severely
prune the palms to prevent them from reaching the critical height
of 2 m.  Landowners, realizing that intensive pruning can substan-
tially prolong the time that tenants can remain on the land, have
decided that tenants have to give up the tenancy and leave the land
after 25 years. One tenant in a village where doudeasso is still prac-
tised shared his case: I got this land through doudeasso in 1986. I
have been cropping since then by severely pruning the oil palm trees,
which never grew over 1 m. Now I am almost at the end of the rental
period. In previous times, the planting of oil palm trees was included
in the doudeasso arrangement and, if lucky, one could plant oil palm
on the rented land before conﬂict arose, and one’s rights were saved.
If not, the risks of losing the land before the end of the 25 years were
not negligible. Nowadays, the right to plant oil palm trees has been
removed from doudeasso and the renter has only the right to grow
food crops. (A farmer from Sognonouhoue, 26/04/2010).
In the case of deman (sharecropping), the risk of conﬂict arises
when the tenant tries to take all the proﬁt from the harvest without
sharing it with the landowner. As soon as a landowner is aware of
this happening, he forces the tenant off the land even if the term
of the contract has not expired. Ahaya,  renting, is also a source of
conﬂict. Land is rented out usually for a period of up to 5 years. After
one year the landowner might rent out the same land to another
tenant who then tends to ﬁght over their cultivation rights and acts
of vandalism occur. The conﬂict often ends in negotiations with the
landowner; typically, the resolution means that the ‘surviving’ ten-
ant must pay two  to three times the fee originally agreed. Another
practice is that if the landowner is in need of cash he sends one
of his relatives to argue that the tenant is using family land, and
threatens to claim it back; in this case, the tenant is also forced to
pay extra to retain access to the land and the right to cultivate.
Two  thirds of the respondents (landowners and tenants) stated
that they had resorted to the political administration to resolve
their conﬂict (Table 6). Only 6.6% said that they had tried to reach
a friendly settlement, 7.7% had gone to the law court, a few had
tried to resolve the conﬂict through the police ofﬁce and 18.6% said
that they tried to ﬁnd a solution by discussion with the families
involved. The disputes are hard to resolve because 93% of the con-
tracts in our sample were oral and only 7% were written. Of  the six
written contracts, only one had been witnessed by the legally desig-
nated authority. The oral contracts were witnessed more often than
not. Witnessing was  very common in Sogadjihoue, but it occurred
infrequently in Tossahoue.
3.5. State intervention related to land tenure on the Adja plateauState intervention in land tenure started in the early colonial era
and the colonial land tenure laws remained effective after Benin
became independent in 1960. Articles 711, 712, and 716 of the
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Table  4
Options jointly identiﬁed for technical and institutional innovation.
Farmers Technical options Institutional options
Landowners - A learning platform
- The use of household waste
- The use of inorganic fertilizer
-  Effect of oil palm fallow on subsequent crops
- Written contracts (to avoid tenants establishing claims on the land).
Reduction of duration of rental agreement to 3–4 years
-  Land registration
Male and female tenants - Stop burning pruned leaves in the ﬁeld
- The rotation of cereals with legumes
-  Use of cow dung/household refuse
-  Burying crop residues in the soil
-  Use of inorganic fertilizer
- Written contract (to prevent landowners chasing them off the land).
-  Involve the village chief in any transaction.
- Written contract to clarify the custom of ‘land gifts’ so that children
can  inherit securely
Source: Akouegbadja village group discussions (n = 70), April–October 2010.
Table 5
Land tenure arrangements for access to land and oil palm trees.
Tenure arrangements Type of land, crops Tenure rights Other terms and conditions
Doudeasso,  pledge or
mortgage
Food crop land, oil
palm land
All cultivation rights, including oil palm trees. The land is to be
returned after the trees reach a height of 2 m.  Not used in Klouekanme
anymore.
Nowadays, it is ﬁxed at 20 or 25 years by landowners.
In the past, the critical height was  not
well-deﬁned; landowners do not use a
tool to measure height. The practical
guideline was that it is reached when
the tenant or landowner is not able
anymore to touch the ﬁrst palm leaf or
fruits while standing under the tree.
This marks the end of the contractual
arrangement for tenants. When the
tenant is taller than the landowner, the
critical height does not have the same
meaning for both of them; this has
caused many conﬂicts in the past. The
2  m rule has been institutionalized and
marks the end of the contract; it has
evolved from a tenants’ right to plant
oil palm as well as food crops, and
become restricted to only food crops.
Deman (2/3), and
deman (1/2),
sharecropping
Food crops land, oil
palm land, oil palm
trees
40–50 years ago, a cultivation right that included oil palm trees. The
palm fruits were shared between the tenant and the landowner.
Nowadays, it covers only the crop harvest. There is no right to tap
palm wine, nor sell trees or collect fruits.
The tenant is not allowed to transfer the right of cultivation to a third
party.
In 1945–1950, the rate of 2/3 of the
yield went to the tenant and 1/3 to the
landowner. Nowadays, because of
shortage of land, landowners claim half
of the yield and agree to purchase the
inorganic fertilizer. Obligations are
shared when shift in deman nature
occurs.
Ahaya,  rental Farm land with
severely pruned oil
palm trees
Cultivation right against a yearly payment. Cultivation right can be
transferred to a third party. Food crops can be cultivated but there is
no  right to plants oil palm trees on the land. The land must be returned
at  the end of the contract (typically, 3–5 years).
The crops are managed by the renter
only. The fee is paid annually; the level
depends on land fertility. 5000 FCFA
per bowive per year for fertile land;
2000 FCFA per bowive per year for less
fertile land.
Dekanhlouehloue,  oil
palm contract
Oil palm fallow
(dekan), oil palm
trees
The purchase of young palm trees gives a right to harvest the trees and
the tapped wine. The land beneath the trees might be farmed by the
landowner.
The purchase is often made by an
alcohol distiller in need of a secured
sap supply.
Aikougbanwhihoue,
Borrowing
Farm land All cultivation rights, not including trees.
No delegation to a third party.
Source: Villages group discussions and key informant discussions, April–October 2010. Format of table inspired by Delville [30].
Notes: bowive is an Adja unit of length, 1 bowive is approximately 2 m.  1 kanti is equivalent to a square of 12 × 12 bowive or approximately 576 m2. 1 D = 655 FCFA.
Table  6
Conﬂict resolution, by institution regulating resolution.
Participation in land
titling programmes
Number of resolved conﬂicts, by the institutions regulating the resolution
Study villages Between family members Political administration Police ofﬁce Law court Through friends
MCA  Agbago 4 24 – – –
–  Akouegbadja 3 17 – 5 1
–  Sogadjihoue – 5 – – 2
–  Tossahoue – 8 – – 3
MCA  Sognonnouhoue 9 6 1 2 –
Total  no. (% of total) 16 (18.6) 60 (66) 1 (1.1) 7 (7.7) 6 (6.6)
Source: Heads of Households survey (n = 90), April–October 2010.
Notes: Agbago, Akouegbadja and Sogadjihoue in Klouekanme had been inﬂuenced by PGTRN land titling intervention in the past. The numbers represent cases of conﬂict,
which had recourse to the speciﬁc institution noted. Empty cells mean no information.
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rench civil code, and the 1935 decree on landholding rules and reg-
lations in the French West African colonies (dated 15 November
935) are the main legal provisions applicable to the identiﬁcation
nd management of property; they fall under the administration
f the state and local authorities. The decree of 2 May  1906 in its
rst, second and third articles, which set up a system for recording
ritten agreements between indigenous parties, is another exam-
le of colonial legislation that persisted into the independence
ra.
In addition, in 1931, the government of Dahomey signed a cir-
ular (Circular 128AP of 19 March) on customary tenure, which
ntil recently has served as reference. In 2007, a new law (law
3 of 16 October) and in 2008 a decree (law 618 of 22 October)
ere approved and signed. The law of 2007 is the latest that gov-
rns land tenure in Benin. However, several of its articles do not
ake into account the actual conditions that have been revealed
n our study of landowners and tenants. Article 73, for example,
oes not recognize a fallow period longer than 5 years and as
 consequence oil palm fallow (dekan)  is omitted entirely. Arti-
le 68 does not recognize farmlands smaller than 2 ha, excluding
lmost all of the Adja plateau’s smallholders. Article 43 refers
o the creation of multi-level structures (on which the MCA
as based its land tenure measures) and article 47 forbids con-
racts that are not written and not witnessed, thereby effectively
aking illegal the personal oral agreements encountered in our
tudy.
In 1995, a government programme was initiated for the man-
gement of territories and natural resources (Programme de Gestion
es Terroirs et Resources Naturelles—PGTRN) that began to issue
nd register land titles, starting in six villages in Klouekanme.
n 2006, the MCA’s land titling and registration programme, in
ollaboration with the Benin government, was initiated in asso-
iation with GRAIB, which became the local executor of the land
itling programme. GRAIB is connected to various multi-level state
ervices such as the village level land management service (Ser-
ice villageois de gestion foncière—SVGF), the sub-district level
and management committee (Sous-commission de gestion foncière
’arrondissement—SCGFA) and the district level land management
ommittee (Comité de gestion foncière—CoGeF).
Table 6 describes the impact of the titling programmes. The
ata suggest that only in Agbago, Akouegbadja and Sogadjihoue,
here both land titling programmes were undertaken, written con-
racts have begun to be used. It is interesting to note that these
hree villages also record the most frequent resort to the politi-
al administration for conﬂict resolution. Tossahoue, which did not
eneﬁt from either of the titling programmes, records the largest
umber of cases of contracts based on oral agreement without wit-
esses. However, in a nearby village, Sogadjihoue, which has been
nﬂuenced by the PGTRN titling programme, the number of oral
ontracts without witnesses has substantially decreased and oral
ontracts are now as a rule witnessed by legally designated author-
ties. This study recorded a case of a written contract witnessed
y the authorities in Agbago, a village whose practices have been
nﬂuenced by both titling programmes.
Currently, subsequent to the titling and registration pro-
rammes, tenants in Agbago and Sognonnouhoue (where the MCA
and titling programme took place) ﬁnd themselves excluded from
ccess to land and cultivation rights. Tenants who  have been
xcluded from the titling and registration effort, reported that they
ere chased off the land they were cultivating when land regis-
ration became imminent: they are not the landowner and their
ropping rights were not taken into account when no witness
ould attest to their tenurial contract. This negative consequence
f land titling underlies tenants’ perceptions of the interventions
hat might beneﬁt them (Table 4) by securing their access to land
nd cultivation rights in the OPBCS.al of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 91– 99 97
4. Discussion
This study analysed a situation in which landowners use a long
fallow for various purposes: soil fertility regeneration, weed sup-
pression and to back up their claims to the land. Tenants have access
to the land for cropping on the basis of short-term tenure but try to
prolong the tenure period through the (sometimes severe) pruning
of the oil palms to prevent the trees growing to a height of 2 m.
However, presently the OPBCS is not a win–win situation; rather,
it can be described as an arena in which competing claims on crop-
ping practices and land ownership are linked with beliefs about
decline and restoration of soil fertility.
Brouwers [8] described the fallow period primarily as a soil fer-
tility management strategy in an integrated agroforestry system.
Our analysis points instead towards an explanation based primarily
on landowners’ interests in long-term control over land. The dif-
ferences between owners’ and renters’ perspectives and practices
regarding land access issues highlight the ways in which the oil
palm fallow emerges from tensions among divergent actors rather
than by design as an integrated agroforestry practice. Changes
in agronomic practices, production constraints and local land
tenure regimes are closely intertwined with the socio-political
dynamic between landowners and land-renters. Complex interac-
tions between customary and formal legal land titling and tenure
further complicate the dynamic.
This study has analysed the actors’ rankings of constraints
(Tables 1 and 2) and thereby revealed discrepancies between the
ﬁve villages. We  speculate that differing perceptions of the impor-
tance of (declining) rainfall may  not indicate differences in weather
patterns between the villages so much so that differences in the
ability of the soil to retain water, i.e., in water-holding capacity,
are related to different levels of soil organic matter. In Agbago and
Akouegbadja, farmers link the practice of pruning and burning oil
palm leaves to the claim that the soil is becoming impoverished.
This claim suggests that the idea that continuous pruning is in itself
bad for the soil is a common belief, which they then rationalize by
linking soil fertility to the practice of burning rather than pruning.
Landowners as well as tenants perceive that household waste (an
important source of organic matter) is generally ineffective for the
subsequent crop in the ﬁrst year and effective in boosting yields
only in the second and third year. Their perception of a delayed
effect partly explains the fact that tenants (contracting cultivation
rights under only three-year tenure) do not apply household waste.
This response has been found also among tenants in Ghana [19,20]
where migrants with insecure rights do not invest in long-term soil
fertility management.
Two  important institutions shape access to and management
of land on the Adja plateau: customary tenure and formal, legal
land rights and contracts. Elsewhere, these two categories have
been opposed respectively as informal versus formal, traditional
versus modern, or socially embedded versus bureaucratic con-
structs [21]. Each set of terms has its own  connotations concerning
the desirable pathways for institutional evolution. North [22] has
deﬁned institutions as the rules of the game that remove uncer-
tainty in human interaction, a deﬁnition that emphasizes reduced
uncertainty and lower ambiguity. However, West African tenure
systems seem to be characterized by ambiguity. Adjei-Nsiah [23],
for instance, has shown that ambiguity is integral to the tenure sys-
tem around Wenchi, Ghana. The ambiguity of the current situation
– with both customary tenure and the more recent efforts to put in
place a formal, legal tenure system – has the potential to increase
competing claims on the Adja plateau, as has occurred elsewhere
under comparable circumstances [23]. Formal legal land titling
and contracts are seen to disadvantage tenant farmers because the
formal contracts increase the power of those who are already in
stronger positions (i.e., the landowners). Cleaver [21] introduced
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he concept of institutional bricolage (patchwork) to recognize the
oexistence of institutions that are likely to co-evolve in indeter-
inable ways rather than to evolve in predictable linear fashion
hereby one institution is replaced by another more modern one.
 consequence of bricolage is that the institutions governing tenure
o not reduce or remove uncertainty but to some extent main-
ain it. Institutional innovation through formal titling programmes
uns the risk of increasing tenants’ insecurity because the power
o manoeuvre in such ambiguous situations is not equally divided
etween landowners and tenants. The landowners effectively use
he patchwork of institutions as political tools.
Currently, the two tenure systems exist uncomfortably side
y side. The doudeasso land arrangement, found only in Sognon-
ouhoue, has been abandoned by landowners in Agbago and
kouegbadja because they considered that it reduced their power
nd gave too many land rights to the tenants, who thus could keep
runing and cropping at their own convenience. The ahaya and
he deman are currently the dominant land tenure arrangements
n our study area and both are of short duration. Tenants typi-
ally have limited rights on these lands and are sometimes chased
ff the land in which they have invested to improve soil fertility.
imilar cases have been reported from Ghana and central Benin
19,24]. These instances continue to occur despite the fact that ten-
nts and landowners may  live in the same village or sometimes
ven in the same household. These tenants, short of land, do not
ave enough security under these tenure arrangements to invest
n long-term soil fertility management and because it is evident
hat the landowners will take the proﬁt from the improved soil fer-
ility (especially if the perceived delayed effect of household waste
roves to be true).
Although the land titling and registration effort seeks to reduce
ncertainty, the social equity of its effects may  be questioned. At
resent, the patchwork of access rules and cultivation rights in the
il palm agroforestry system allow tenants to access land and grow
ood crops but the cost is paid both in terms of soil fertility and ten-
nts’ security. Our data suggest that these tensions could be relaxed
y clearer agreements between both parties, based on a clariﬁca-
ion of rights and non-authorized practices, and a formalization of
he rights enshrined in the customary land tenure arrangements
etween owners and tenants.
The diagnostic study made use of a natural experiment in the
orm of MCA’s formal land titling programme, which contributed
o the exclusion of tenants operating under customary arrange-
ents for access to land and the right to grow food crops Changes
n land tenure are shown in our study to undermine the long-term
il palm fallow land use system, echoing ﬁndings from other politi-
al ecology research [25,26]. State intervention by means of formal
and titling and registration has allowed landowners to use their
and as collateral for credit. However, the intervention also opens
p the possibility that others will lose land through default and by
he sale of land to people outside the farming community. A com-
on  consequence of such a dynamic is that it can be expected to
oncentrate land ownership and disenfranchise smallholders and
enters. The local policy on claims to titles on land, in practice priv-
leges landowners and undermines the ﬂexibility of the local land
enure system. Male and female tenants are the losers. Further-
ore, registration penalizes the holders of secondary land rights,
specially women and herders; these rights are not recorded in
he register and are more easily dismissed in disputed claims [27].
he social dynamics in this case closely echo those described by
chroeder [25] in the Gambia, where male landholders effectively
ook control over land through practices promoted by a develop-
ent project that did not pay attention to the female gardeners’
ights [28].
The government of Benin has added to the pressure created by
he changes in land tenure and titling by launching a national oilal of Life Sciences 60– 63 (2012) 91– 99
palm plantation policy designed to increase oil production. How-
ever, this policy has overlooked the fact that the Adja plateau is
not suitable for large-scale plantations aiming to produce palm oil.
It does not take into account the aspirations of landowners and
tenants in the OPBCS, thereby in effect creating another potential
source of competing claims, as has occurred elsewhere under com-
parable circumstances [29]. Under the conditions described in this
article, actions to regulate the tension between landowners and
tenants through consultation and negotiation that also involve the
local authorities [30], could be encouraged. Such consultation and
negotiation have proven to be successful elsewhere in Benin [9].
Written contracts between landowners and tenants are begin-
ning to be used though still somewhat sparingly and the resort of
both parties to witnesses and administrative authorities (Table 6)
is increasing. The written contracts that existed during our
study relate to (1) the doudeasso,  a pledging agreement, (2) the
dekanhlouehloue, relating to palm tree contracts, and (3), land
purchases. However, written contracts that express the rules of
customary land tenure are never a perfect solution because of the
rigidity they bring to local land transactions. Written contracts
also must be registered with and enforced by legal authorities,
implying additional costs in the form of fees and observance of
the letter of laws such as the land tenure law of 2007. Moreover,
it is not exactly clear what kind of endorsement written con-
tracts dealing with customary arrangements might need, because
(at present) they do not resemble a formal legal document [31].
There are so many omissions and unwritten conditions in the cer-
tiﬁcates drawn up by farmers that the exact nature of the rights
they confer is unclear. Similarly, the legal inconsistencies in Benin’s
land tenure law of 2007 raise questions about its applicability and
functioning.
5. Conclusions
Our diagnostic study has demonstrated how the technical and
institutional dimensions of the OPBCS are intertwined, with nega-
tive consequences for tenant security and soil fertility.
The challenge of sustaining or improving the OPBCS on the Adja
plateau requires further research in several ﬁelds. The nature of
the biophysical and social dynamics of soil fertility in the oil palm
fallow remains an unsolved contextual question. For example, the
mechanisms by which soil fertility is affected by the use of inor-
ganic fertilizer and organic amendments, the choice of crop species
and crop varieties, and the power balance between landlords and
tenants, are not yet known. An ethnography on soil fertility man-
agement practice, including analysis of the actors’ knowledge about
soil fertility and the social organization and performance of those
practices, would help to provide an answer [32,33]. The various land
management practices offer the possibility of creating a research
design for identifying and measuring the mechanisms of soil degra-
dation or soil fertility maintenance [34]. Participatory soil fertility
experiments could be conducted with landowners and tenants
in the villages of Akouegbadja and Agbago to study oil palm fal-
low in relation to the various ways of using household waste in
order to co-produce effective technologies that are biophysically
effective and socially acceptable within the given institutional con-
text.
Tenants and landowners recognize that land tenure, state inter-
vention and the law to an important extent determine their
capacity to produce oil palm products. It is argued in this article
that the challenge is not only to develop soil fertility management
strategies for higher yield but also to bring about institutional trans-
formations within which such strategies would become rational for
tenants and landowners. The current patchwork of socially embed-
ded customary land tenure arrangements and bureaucratic formal
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itling programmes would need to be blended, to create a hybrid
ystem, if the negative effects of replacing informal tenure systems
y formal ones are to be avoided. While studies suggest that pro-
oting tenure security is the efﬁcient way to promote investment
n land management [35], such changes might transform the OPBCS
rom a zero-sum agroforestry system based on competing claims
nto a win–win situation.
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ppendix A. List of acronyms
Acronym French meaning English meaning
OPBCS – Oil palm based cropping
system
NGO – Non-governmental
organization
GRAIB Groupe de Recherche et
d’Appui aux Initiatives de
Base pour un
Développement Durable
Research group of support
to  local initiatives for
sustainable development
MCA  – Millennium challenge
account
FAO – World Food and
Agriculture Organization
FDGs – Focus group discussions
PGTRN Programme de Gestion des
Terroirs et des Ressources
Naturelles
Management of territories
and natural resources
programme
SVGF Service Villageois de
Gestion Foncière
Village level land
management service
SCGFA Sous-Commission de
Gestion Foncière
d’Arrondissement
Sub-district level land
management committee
CoGEF Comité de Gestion Foncière District level land
management committee
Kanti unit of area – Equals 576 m2 or
approximately 0.06 ha
FCFA – 1 D = 655 FCFA
Bowive – Adja unit of length;
approximately 2 m
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